Memory and Temporal Awareness by Fernandez, Jordi
MEMORY AND TEMPORAL AWARENESS 
Jordi Fernández   (Macquarie University) 
Comments welcome: jfernandez@scmp.mq.edu.au 
 
1. The project 
Feeling of pastness 
If you remember that p, then the fact that p appears to you as having happened in the past. 
Let’s specify the content of memory experiences in a way that respects this feature. 
 
2. Specifying “content” 
Memory experiences can be correct or incorrect. 
The content of a memory experience is what it takes for it to be correct.  
To say that the content of M is that p = to say that what it takes for M to be true is that p.  
 
3. “What it takes for M to be true” 
Suppose I utter ‘it’s cold here’ (call that utterance U). 
In situation A 
It’s cold in the classrrom, I’m in the classroom and it’s warm outside. 
In situation B 
It’s cold outside, I’m outside and it’s warm in the classroom. 
Consider U in A. What does it take for it to be true? 
• In one sense: that it’s cold in the classroom. 
• In a different sense: that it’s cold where U takes place. 
You could ask ‘do I describe B correctly when I utter U in A’? 
In the first sense, I don’t. In the second sense, I do.  
So “the content of a memory experience is what it takes for it to be correct” is ambiguous. 
 I mean what it takes for it to be correct in the first sense. 
 
4. The Right Amount of Info test / RAI 
Suppose that we are given a proposal about the content of M: M’s content is that P.  
How to evaluate it? For any possible situation W, this should happen: 
i. If, intuitively, M represents W correctly, then P is the case in W. 
ii. If, intuitively, M represents W incorrectly, then P is not the case in W.  
If the proposal fails to meet (i), it attributes too much information to memories. 
If the proposal fails to meet (ii), it attributes too little information to memories. 
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5. The Absolute view 
Consider a subject S. Take a memory experience M that S would express by uttering “I remember 
that q.”.Let t2 be the time at which S has M. Then, there is some period of time t1 before t2 
such that the content of M is: q happens at t1 
Trouble with RAI 
In W1: 
q happens at t1 & you witness it 
At t2, you have a memory experience M that you’d express with “ I remember that q ” 
In W2: 
q happens at t1 & you don’t exist 
Absolutist: M represents W2 accurately. 
Intuitively: It doesn’t. 
 
6. The Relative view 
Consider a subject S. Take a memory experience M that S would express by uttering “I remember 
that q.”. There is some period of time T such that  
the content of M is: q happens T-earlier than M 
Trouble with RAI 
In W1: 
q happens at t1 & you witness it 
At t2, you have a memory experience M that you’d express with “ I remember that q ” 
In W3: 
Q happens at t1 & you witness it. Then, you travel back in time before t1 and have M. 
Relativist: M in W1 does not represent W3 accurately. 
Intuitively: It does. 
 
7. Causal self-reference view 
 Consider a subject S. If M is a memory experience that S would express by uttering “I remember 
that q”, then there is a perceptual experience P that S would express by uttering “I perceive 
that q” such that the content of M is: M was caused by P, which was caused by q 
 
Trouble with RAI 
In W1: 
q happens at t1 and you have a perceptual experience P that you’d express with “I 
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perceive that q.” At t2, you have a memory experience M that you’d express with “ I 
remember that q .” M is caused by P & P is caused by q. 
In W4: 
q happens at t1 & you have P.  Then, you have M at t2. M was caused by P and, on this 
occasion, P was caused by q. (But, normally, the fact that q would not cause P.) 
CSR:  M in W1 represents W4 accurately. 
Intuitively: It does not.  
 
8. The veridical view1
Consider a subject S. Take a memory experience M that she would express by uttering “I 
remember that q”. There is a perceptual experience P that she’d express with “I perceive that q” 
such that the content of M is: M was caused by P, which is veridical 
 
9. Virtues of the veridical view 
 It deals with the W2 case: 
 M in W1 represents W2 incorrectly (M doesn’t happen in W2). 
 It deals with the W3 case: 
 M in W1 represents W3 correctly (M was backwards-caused by a percept experience in W3). 
 It deals with the W4 case: 
 M in W1 represents W4 incorrectly (The perceptual experience in W4 is not veridical). 
 
So what does this have to do with Time and Consciousness? 
 
According to the veridical view, when one remembers something, one is in cognitive contact 
with the causal history of the very experience one is having. 
Presumably, it’s nomologically necessary that: Events in the causal history of your memories are 
in the past. 
By remembering something, then, you are in cognitive contact with events that, as a matter of 
natural law, are indeed in the past 
But the ‘feeling of pastness’ is not the experience of time. It is the experience of origin or causal 
history. 
                                                 
1 No pun intended 
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